Investigation of a Cluster of Sequence Type 22 Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Transmission in a Community Setting. by Toleman, Michelle S et al.
 1 
Investigation of a Cluster of ST22 MRSA Transmission in a Community Setting 
Michelle S. Toleman*+1,2,3, Emmeline R. Watkins*4, Tom Williams1, Beth Blane1, Belinda 
Sadler5, Ewan M. Harrison1, Francesc Coll6, Julian Parkhill2, Bernadette Nazareth4, Nicholas 
M. Brown7, Sharon J. Peacock1,2,3,6. 
 
1University of Cambridge, 2Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute, 3Cambridge University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, 4Health Protection Team, Public Health England - East of 
England, 5Infection Prevention & Control, Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Clinical 
Commissioning Group, 6London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 7Public Health 
England Clinical Microbiology and Public Health Laboratory, Cambridge. All in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
*Both authors contributed equally 
+Corresponding author: Dr Michelle Toleman at Department of Medicine, University of 
Cambridge, Level 5, Box 157, Addenbrooke’s Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, United 
Kingdom, or at email address mst39@cam.ac.uk. 
 
 
Word counts 
Abstract: 247 
Manuscript: 2999 
 
  
 2 
RUNNING TITLE 
Community cluster of ST22 MRSA 
 
SUMMARY 
This study identifies a community cluster of MRSA transmission missed by routine practice 
and provides genomic evidence for transmission of a typically-nosocomial lineage within 
community rather than hospital settings. Systematic whole-genome sequencing may 
increase detection of such outbreaks.  
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ABSTRACT  
Background Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has typically been used to confirm or refute 
hospital/ward outbreaks of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) identified 
through routine practice. However, appropriately targeted WGS strategies that identify 
routinely ‘undetectable’ transmission remains the ultimate aim.  
 
Methods WGS of MRSA isolates sent to a regional microbiological laboratory was 
performed as part of a 12-month prospective observational study. Phylogenetic analyses 
identified a genetically-related cluster of E-MRSA15 isolated from patients registered to the 
same General Practice (GP) surgery. This led to an investigation to identify epidemiological 
links, find additional cases and determine potential for on-going transmission.  
 
Results We identified 15 MRSA-positive individuals with 27 highly-related MRSA isolates 
who were linked to the GP surgery, two of whom died with MRSA bacteremia. Of the 13 
cases who were further investigated, 11 had attended a leg ulcer/podiatry clinic. Cases 
lacked epidemiological links to hospitals, suggesting that transmission occurred elsewhere. 
Environmental and staff screening at the GP surgery did not identify an on-going source of 
infection. 
 
Conclusions Surveillance in the United Kingdom shows that the proportion of MRSA 
bacteremias apportioned to hospitals is decreasing, suggesting the need for greater focus on 
the detection of MRSA outbreaks and transmission in the community. This case study 
confirms that the typically nosocomial lineage (E-MRSA15) can transmit within community 
settings. Our study exemplifies the continued importance of WGS in detecting outbreaks 
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including those which may be missed by routine practice, and suggests that universal WGS 
of bacteremia isolates may help detect outbreaks in low-surveillance settings.  
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BACKGROUND 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the emergence of the epidemic methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (EMRSA)-15 lineage (multilocus sequence type (ST) 22) in 1991 was 
followed by its rapid dissemination throughout UK hospitals and long-term care facilities 
(LTCFs) [1-4]. This was associated with a dramatic increase in the rate of MRSA bacteremia 
until rates began to decline in the mid-2000s [5]. Voluntary reporting of MRSA bacteremia 
in England was replaced by mandatory reporting in 2001 [6], to which mandatory enhanced 
epidemiological surveillance was added in 2005 [7]. Since 2013, investigation of MRSA 
bacteremia requires a locally administered Post-Infection Review (PIR), which aims to 
identify how the case occurred and preventative actions to avoid recurrence. Consequently, 
responsibility for cases are attributed to the organisation best placed to implement these 
actions [8].   
 
Currently, only 40% of these reported bacteraemia cases are attributed to a hospital, which 
suggests that transmission outside of hospitals is a substantial contributor to overall MRSA 
bacteremia rates [9]. Definitive evidence for community transmission as a driver of MRSA 
infection in the UK is limited, but is supported by a recent epidemiological and bacterial 
genomic survey that captured transmission events over a 16,000km2 area of the East of 
England [10].  This argued against conventional wisdom that ST22 is largely healthcare 
associated in the UK [1,11], and provided evidence for a substantial burden of MRSA 
transmission outside of hospital settings (i.e. in the community). 
 
Despite this, the focus on MRSA prevention and control remains hospital-centric. Here, we 
characterise the community-based transmission of EMRSA-15 (typically considered a 
nosocomial lineage) in a General Practice (GP) surgery. This study argues for a renewed 
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focus on infection control in community settings and demonstrates the role of bacterial 
whole-genome sequencing (WGS) in community MRSA surveillance and infection control.  
 
METHODS 
Study design 
A cluster of 13 MRSA-positive individuals registered to a single GP surgery in 
Cambridgeshire was first detected during a 12-month prospective study of all MRSA-
positive samples processed by the Public Health England (PHE) Clinical Microbiology and 
Public Health Laboratory, Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (CUH) in 
Cambridge, UK. This study has been described in detail elsewhere [10]. In brief, 1,465 
individuals were identified with MRSA isolated at least once from either screening swabs 
and/or clinical specimens, and WGS of 2,282 MRSA isolates from these cases. Combined 
analysis of WGS data revealed a single large cluster of closely-related MRSA (defined based 
on a pairwise single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) distance <50 SNPs) that contained 22 
isolates from these 13 individuals. This formed the starting point for a public health 
investigation and the study described here.  
 
Public health investigation 
The detection of the MRSA cluster resulted in an investigation conducted in May 2015 by 
the local PHE health protection team. The GP surgery had more than 10,000 registered 
patients and provided specialist services including diabetic and podiatry clinics. The 13 
people involved in the MRSA cluster (defined as cases) were sent an information sheet and 
details of opt-out consent prior to individual GP record review. If consent was not withheld 
and records were available, data were collected on demographics, co-morbidities and date 
of first MRSA detection. In the six-months prior to each patient’s first recorded positive 
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MRSA result, healthcare attendance (primary care, hospital outpatient, or in-patient) and 
microbiological samples that were MRSA-negative were recorded. Incidence rates of MRSA-
positive individuals were calculated per 10,000 registered patients at the study surgery. 
The CUH laboratory information system was used to determine incidence of MRSA 
positivity based on samples submitted to CUH from four comparable practices within the 
same region (defined as practices with >10,000 registered patients in the same GP 
Classification Group) [12]. All data were collected and analysed within the context of the 
public health investigation.  
 
Staff at the GP surgery were invited to undergo MRSA screening (nose/throat/groin swabs) 
following attendance at an information session and written consent. Environmental MRSA 
screening was performed at 40 sampling points in the building. Samples were taken from 
high-contact equipment and surfaces in the following areas: two randomly selected medical 
clinic consultation rooms, two nursing clinic rooms (where the ulcer clinic, which was the 
strongest epidemiological link between patients, was held), and shared patient waiting 
areas. At each sampling point, an area of approximately 10cm-by-10cm (or entire surface of 
handles) was swabbed and cultured for MRSA using direct plating onto chromogenic agar 
[13]. 
 
Extended case-finding was performed to identify further cases that might be linked to the 
cluster over a longer time period, and for whom MRSA isolates had been stored and could 
be retrieved for sequencing. This involved three different approaches. (i) A retrospective 
search was performed of the CUH information system for MRSA-positive samples submitted 
by the GP surgery between January 2006 until June 2015. These data were then cross-
referenced with the bacterial archive database to determine if isolates had been stored at -
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80°C. (ii) Laboratory surveillance was conducted in the laboratory between November 2015 
and February 2016 to detect MRSA-positive individuals from the GP surgery. (iii) Recent 
PIRs at the GP surgery were reviewed. Isolates were requested from the receiving hospital 
for WGS and patient records reviewed as described above.  
 
WGS, typing and data analysis  
DNA was extracted, libraries prepared, and 150-bp paired end sequences determined on an 
Illumina HiSeq2000 (original study isolates) or MiSeq (isolates identified through 
additional case finding). Methods were as previously described [14]. Details of reads, depth 
of coverage/N50 are provided in Table S1. Sequence data were submitted to the European 
Nucleotide Archive (www.ebi.ac.uk/ena), accession numbers are also listed in Table S1. STs 
were assigned using sequence data, an in-house script and the MLST database 
(http://saureus.mlst.net/), and STs were assigned to clonal complexes (CC). Isolates were 
mapped using SMALT (http://www.sanger.ac.uk/science/tools/smalt-0) to the E-MRSA15 
reference genome (strain HO 5096 0412, accession HE681097). Mobile genetic elements, 
indels and regions of high-density SNPs were excluded to identify the phylogenetically 
informative core genome for each isolate, and SNPs used to create a mid-point rooted, 
maximum-likelihood phylogeny using RAxML with 100 bootstraps [15]. Trees were 
visualised using Figtree (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/) and ITOL 
(http://itol.embl.de/). In-silico PCR of the variable X-region of the spa gene was undertaken 
using the genome data and published primers [16]. Spa-type was then determined using 
SpaTyper (http://spatyper.fortinbras.us). 
 
RESULTS 
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During the year-long prospective MRSA study of carriage and clinical MRSA isolates in the 
East of England between April 2012 and April 2013, we identified a number of potential 
outbreaks based on genomic relatedness and epidemiological links [10]. One potential 
outbreak consisted of thirteen MRSA-positive individuals (22 isolates) registered with the 
same general practice (GP) surgery in Cambridgeshire and therefore was of particular 
interest. All thirteen isolates were ST22 and part of the EMRSA-15 clade (Figure 1). We 
initiated an investigation to rule out on-going transmission, and to elucidate if this 
represented community-based transmission or ‘spill-over’ from a hospital/LTCF. Extended 
case finding identified additional MRSA-positive individuals attending the same GP with 
samples available for sequencing (Figure 2). First, retrospective review of electronic 
laboratory records identified four individuals with a total of seven isolates retrievable for 
sequencing, one of whom (Patient(P)04) had already been identified in the initial 13 cases. 
Second, prospective surveillance of MRSA-positive samples sent from the GP surgery over 
three months between November 2015-February 2016 and surveillance of new positive 
MRSA samples by the infection control team identified three retrievable isolates from three 
individuals. Third, two PIRs had been undertaken in 2014/2015 (P12/P13). Both patients 
had died with MRSA bacteremia in another regional hospital. A single isolate from each 
blood culture was obtained for each patient from the admitting hospital. A summary of the 
22 patients (34 isolates) from the original study and additional case-finding is provided in 
Table 1. The median number of MRSA isolates per patient was 1 (range 1-4). Four patients 
had only screening samples submitted. Of those clinical samples submitted, 61% were 
reported as superficial swabs of lower limbs/foot, while three were from blood cultures and 
one from pus (all from different patients.) 
 
Genetic analysis 
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Spa-genotyping showed that the cluster was formed of two main spa types (t032, t294) with 
three additional variants (Figure S1). STs were derived from WGS data for the 12 MRSA 
isolates identified through additional case finding. The predominant ST was ST22 (7 
isolates, 3 individuals), the remainder being ST45 (3 isolates, 3 individuals), ST6 (1 isolate) 
and ST1539 (a single-locus variant of ST221, 1 isolate). The non-ST22 cases were excluded 
from further analysis. After combining the 22 ST22 isolates from the original study and 7 
from additional case-finding to a total of 29 ST22 isolates, a maximum-likelihood tree was 
constructed based on SNPs in the core genome compared to the EMRSA-15 reference 
genome. This demonstrated clustering of 27 of the 29 ST22 isolates from 15 individuals 
(Figure 3), now referred to as cases. Of these, 13 had been identified in the original cluster 
and the additional two isolates were from two cases (P12 and P13) identified during PIRs of 
fatal bloodstream infections. The median pairwise SNP distance between the 27 cluster 
isolates from these 15 cases was 21 (range 0 to 58, interquartile range 10 to 37). The 
median pairwise SNP distance for cluster isolates from the same person (in 8 cases with 
more than one isolate) was five (range 0 to 60, interquartile range 1.5 to 15.5). One patient 
(P04) had cluster isolates that extended over a period of 34 months (a basal isolate in 2012, 
and three isolates in 2014/15 with pairwise distances of 60, 59 and 57 SNPs from the 2012 
isolate). 
 
Public health investigation 
To further understand the cluster, a public health investigation was performed to 
investigate the 15 genomically linked cases, together with screening of staff and the 
environment for the presence of MRSA. Two of the 15 cases (P14/P15) were excluded from 
further epidemiological analysis due to missing patient records or refusal of consent. Of the 
remaining 13 cases, the median age was 80 years (range 12-91, IQ range: 61.5-81.5) at the 
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time of the investigation, and six cases (46%) were women. Geographical mapping of first 
MRSA isolation date and place of residence for each case demonstrated that cases lived 
within 5.6km of each other and two individuals (P10/P11) lived on the same street.  No 
cases lived in the same household or LTCF. 
 
Review of sample requesting information showed a predominance of lower limb swabs 
(cases with samples including lower limb, 9; screen alone, 1; bacteremia alone, 2). GP 
medical records revealed that the date of first recorded MRSA positive sample for cases 
ranged from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 4A). Healthcare contact by each case in the six months 
prior to first MRSA detection was extensive for all but two patients (Figure 4B). Six of the 13 
cases had attended hospital in this period, of whom three cases (P08/P11/P12) had 
attended only one hospital, two cases (P05/P13) had attended two different hospitals, and 
one (P10) had attended three different hospitals. Crucially, no overall link could be made 
between cases and attendance at a hospital (Figure 4A). Six individuals had one or more 
samples that were negative for MRSA in the six-months prior to their MRSA first detection 
date, and had no record of hospital attendance in the intervening time. Eleven of the 13 
cases had attended the GP leg ulcer clinic. P5 and P11 had not, but P11 lived in the same 
road as P10.  
 
A total of 57 GP surgery staff (approximately 90% of current clinical/non-clinical 
employees) received multi-site MRSA screens, all of which were negative. This included four 
nurses who had worked at the ulcer clinic since the first positive MRSA samples in 2008. 
Forty environmental samples were taken from communal waiting areas and clinic rooms, all 
of which were also MRSA-negative.  
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Given that this cluster was only identified fortuitously by genome sequencing, we sought to 
determine if the incidence rate in the practice had been higher than that expected. This was 
achieved by comparing the incidence rate of MRSA-positive samples submitted to the CUH 
diagnostic microbiology laboratory between 2006-2013 between the study GP surgery and 
four other practices of a similar size and patient demographic within Cambridgeshire. This 
showed a fluctuating rate over time for all four practices, with no identifiable outbreak 
signal for the general practice under investigation (Figure S2).  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we found that routine infection control failed to detect or prevent a 
community cluster involving fifteen people who carried or were infected with ST22 MRSA. 
This was despite two fatal cases of bacteremia that were investigated using standard public 
health procedures [17], but were not linked to each other or the cluster until WGS was 
undertaken. Overall, epidemiological evidence was consistent with onwards MRSA 
transmission in the community, although the precise circumstances under which this 
occurred could not be defined. Most patients were high users of primary care services 
including a GP leg ulcer clinic, although transmission through other unidentified contacts 
cannot be ruled out.  
 
One case (P04) had a history of testing MRSA positive since December 2008, and WGS on 
available isolates confirmed carriage of the same MRSA lineage over a period of 34 months. 
The diversity within the isolates from P04 encompasses that of isolates from all other cases, 
potentially suggesting that persistent carriage in this case had contributed to spread of this 
lineage. Due to limited sampling, it is not possible to rule out re-infection but the most 
recent common ancestor of these isolates would have dated to around 2006 (based on a 
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SNP rate of ~3.5 SNPs/genome/year in ST22 [24]), consistent with carriage since that date. 
The important contribution of long-term MRSA carriers to transmission in hospitals has 
been shown previously [18], and is likely to be relevant in other settings. Decolonisation of 
persistent carriers with chronic wounds such as leg ulcers is notoriously difficult, and 
rigorous infection control is required during treatment such as dressing changes when 
bacterial shedding can occur. MRSA was not isolated from staff or the environment at the 
GP practice during a point-prevalence survey, but this was performed a considerable period 
of time after the cluster had become established and was undertaken largely to identify 
modifiable factors.  
 
MRSA ST22 is the most common MRSA lineage associated with healthcare-associated 
infection in the UK, and based on the higher overall prevalence of MRSA in hospitals versus 
the community in the last few decades it has been assumed that the predominant 
directionality of spread is from hospitals into the community. Previous studies conducted in 
the UK have isolated ST22 from the community [19,20,21], but bacterial typing lacked 
sufficient resolution to infer transmission. To support this, spa genotyping of the cluster 
isolates in this study was undertaken, and based on the presence of a number of spa-types it 
is unlikely that such typing would have identified this cluster. WGS has been used to 
confirm that transmission of a PVL-positive, single locus variant of ST22 occurred from a 
special care baby unit into the community where it subsequently persisted [22,23]. By 
contrast, the findings of our study suggest that most cases (9 of 13) associated with the 
MRSA cluster had either not attended a hospital or had at least one intervening sample that 
was MRSA-negative in the six months prior to first MRSA detection. The majority of cases 
had links to clinic attendance in the community (in particular for ulcer care), providing 
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genomic evidence for transmission of this typically-nosocomial lineage within community 
rather than hospital settings.  
 
A greater focus is needed to detect MRSA transmission in the community if overall MRSA 
bacteremia rates are to be further reduced. The role of infection prevention and control in 
the community will become increasingly relevant as initiatives are rolled out that increase 
delivery of care outside of hospitals [25], and will require a review of the current 
predominantly hospital-centric structure of infection services [19]. Several methodological 
approaches could be considered. A low-cost passive surveillance option would count cases 
from submitting locations over time, associated with a defined threshold above which an 
investigation is triggered. However, the protracted period over which transmission 
occurred in the cluster described here meant rates of MRSA over time for the GP surgery 
were comparable with other similar practices. Consequently, the real-time analysis of 
epidemiological data from this practice is unlikely to have triggered an outbreak 
investigation. However, the addition of WGS allowed robust assessment of the relatedness 
of MRSA isolates and cases, and the implementation of surveillance WGS to control 
procedures may be a necessary tool if MRSA transmission is to be targeted by rapid 
interventions.   
 
This study has a number of limitations. We cannot exclude that the outbreak may have been 
detected through other typing methods not undertaken here, such as pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis. We did not undertake sampling for asymptomatic MRSA carriers in the 
wider community, which is likely to have under-represented the extent of the cluster. Only a 
small proportion of the MRSA isolated from samples submitted by the GP surgery were 
available for sequencing, reducing the number of cases that could be included from the 
 15 
retrospective look-back. The study was not sufficiently powered to conduct a case-case 
design (cases with MRSA assigned to the cluster versus unrelated MRSA cases) to determine 
specific risk factors for MRSA acquisition, as comparison between practices was limited due 
to the variation in services provided. Finally, not all staff who may have been involved in the 
cluster were screened for MRSA due to staff turnover.   
  
In conclusion, the detection of transmission and outbreaks associated with MRSA ST22 
carriage and infection in the community is incomplete. In particular, this case-study 
demonstrates the need to consider GP surgeries as transmission hotspots. Whilst WGS of all 
MRSA isolates from GP surgeries may not be cost-effective, this case-study demonstrates 
how universal WGS of bacteremia isolates can detect relatedness and potential 
transmission events in settings which are not typically regarded as foci of transmission. 
Systematic WGS strategies could provide more accurate attribution of source, provide a 
mechanism for more efficient targeting of infection control, and lead to further reductions 
in the number of people who become colonised by, and go on to develop MRSA bacteremia. 
 
Ethics approval/consent to participate:  Study protocol approval for the prospective 
study was granted by the National Research Ethics Service (ref: 11/EE/0499), the National 
Information Governance Board Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (ref: ECC 8-
05(h)/2011), and the Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust Research and 
Development Department (ref: A092428). The 13 people involved in the MRSA cluster were 
sent an information sheet and details of opt-out consent prior to individual GP record 
review. All data were collected and analysed within the context of the public health 
investigation.  
 
 16 
Competing interests: NB is on the advisory board for Discuva Ltd. All other authors 
declare that they have no competing interests.  
 
Funding: This work was supported by grants from the UK Clinical Research Collaboration 
Translational Infection Research Initiative, and the Medical Research Council (Grant 
Number G1000803) with contributions to the Grant from the Biotechnology and Biological 
Sciences Research Council, the National Institute for Health Research on behalf of the 
Department of Health, and the Chief Scientist Office of the Scottish Government Health 
Directorate (to Prof. Peacock); by a Healthcare Infection Society Major Research Grant (to 
Prof. Peacock), and by Wellcome Trust grant number 098051 awarded to the Wellcome 
Trust Sanger Institute.  MST was a Wellcome Trust Clinical PhD Fellow. FC was supported 
by the Wellcome Trust (201344/Z/16/Z).  These sponsors of the study had no role in study 
design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. The public 
health investigation was supported by Public Health England. 
 
Authors’ contributions: M.S.T. and E.W. undertook the epidemiological and bioinformatic 
analyses with contributions from T.W., E.M.H., F.C. Laboratory work was conducted by B. B. 
The public health investigation was managed by B.N. and N.B.; the investigation team also 
consisted of M.S.T., E.W., B.S., T.W. and S.J.P. Additional screening was undertaken on-site by 
B.S. and M.S.T. S.J.P. and J.P. supervised and managed the study. All authors had access to the 
data and read, contributed, and approved the final manuscript. 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank the practice manager and other staff at the GP surgery for 
their co-operation and involvement in this investigation, and Lynn Rodrigues and Rachel 
Thaxter for their contribution. We thank Jill Eastment, Dr M. Esteé Torok, Dr Sandra Reuter 
 17 
and Dr Dorota Jamrozy for their advice and contributions. We acknowledge the Wellcome 
Trust Sanger Institute’s core Sequencing Production Groups and Pathogen Informatics 
Group. 
 
References  
1. Ellington MJ, Hope R, Livermore DM, Kearns AM, Henderson K, Cookson BD, et al. 
Decline of EMRSA-16 amongst methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus causing 
bacteraemias in the UK between 2001 and 2007. J Antimicrob Chemother 2010, 
65:446-448. 
2. Reuter S, Torok ME, Holden MT, Reynolds R, Raven KE, Blane B, et al: Building a 
genomic framework for prospective MRSA surveillance in the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland. Genome Res 2016, 26:263-270. 
3. Holden MT, Hsu LY, Kurt K, Weinert LA, Mather AE, Harris SR, et al: A genomic 
portrait of the emergence, evolution, and global spread of a methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus pandemic. Genome Res 2013, 23:653-664. 
4. Moore PCL, Lindsay JA: Molecular characterisation of the dominant UK methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus strains, EMRSA-15 and EMRSA-16. J Med Microbiol 
2002, 51:516-521. 
5. Johnson AP, Aucken HM, Cavendish S, Ganner M, Wale MC, Warner M, et al: 
Dominance of EMRSA-15 and -16 among MRSA causing nosocomial bacteraemia in 
the UK: analysis of isolates from the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
System (EARSS). J Antimicrob Chemother 2001, 48:143-144. 
6. Johnson AP, Davies J, Guy R, Abernethy J, Sheridan E, Pearson A, Duckworth G: 
Mandatory surveillance of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
 18 
bacteraemia in England: the first 10 years. J Antimicrob Chemother 2012, 67:802-
809. 
7. Duerden B, Fry C, Johnson AP, Wilcox MH: The Control of Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus Blood Stream Infections in England. Open Forum Infect Dis 
2015, 2:ofv035. 
8. NHS England. Guidance on the reporting and monitoring arrangements and post 
infection review process for MRSA bloodstream infections from April 2014 (v2)   
https://www.england.nhs.uk/patientsafety/wp-
content/uploads/sites/32/2014/02/post-inf-guidance2.pdf. Accessed: 01.10.16. 
9. MRSA bacteraemia: monthly data by post infection review assignment. First 
published: 6th August 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mrsa-
bacteraemia-monthly-data-by-post-infection-review-assignment. 
10. Coll F, Harrison EM, Toleman MS, Reuter S, Blane B, Brown NM, Torok ME, Parkhill J, 
Peacock SJ. Extensive cryptic transmission of MRSA revealed by population-based 
longitudinal genomic surveillance. Submitted, Science Translational Medicine. 
11. Tosas Auguet O, Betley JR, Stabler RA, Patel A, Ioannou A, Marbach H, Hearn P, Aryee 
A, Goldenberg SD, Otter JA, et al: Evidence for Community Transmission of 
Community-Associated but Not Health-Care-Associated Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus Strains Linked to Social and Material Deprivation: Spatial 
Analysis of Cross-sectional Data. PLoS Med 2016, doi: 13:e1001944. 
12. General Practice Classification Groups Practices with similar characteristics. 
Yorkshire and Humber Public Health Observatory, Yorkshire and Humber Public 
Health Observatory Published date: Tuesday, 1st March 2011 
http://www.yhpho.org.uk/resource/item.aspx?RID=103767 
 19 
13. Public Health England. Standards for Microbiology Investigations. Investigation of 
Specimens for Screening for MRSA. Issue date: 03.04.14.  
14. Reuter S, Ellington MJ, Cartwright EJ, Koser CU, Torok ME, Gouliouris T, et al: Rapid 
bacterial whole-genome sequencing to enhance diagnostic and public health 
microbiology. JAMA Intern Med 2013, 173:1397-1404. 
15. Stamatakis A, Ludwig T, Meier H: RAxML-III: a fast program for maximum 
likelihood-based inference of large phylogenetic trees. Bioinformatics 2005, 21:456-
463. 
16.  Kahl BC, Mellmann A, Deiwick S, Peters G, Harmsen D. Variation of the polymorphic 
region X of the protein A gene during persistent airway infection of cystic fibrosis 
patients reflects two independent mechanisms  of genetic change in Staphylococcus 
aureus. J Clin Microbiol 2005, 43(1):502-5. 
17. Public Health England. Post Infection Review Toolkit. 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/mrsa-pir-guid-
april14.pdf. Accessed 14/02/2016. 
18. Tong SY, Holden MT, Nickerson EK, Cooper BS, Koser CU, Cori A, et al: Genome 
sequencing defines phylogeny and spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus in a high transmission setting. Genome Res 2015, 25:111-118. 
19. Miller R, Walker AS, Knox K, Wyllie D, Paul J, Haworth E, et al. 'Feral' and 'wild'-type 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in the United Kingdom. Epidemiol Infect 
2010, 138:655-665. 
20. Mollaghan AM, Lucey B, Coffey A, Cotter L: Emergence of MRSA clone ST22 in 
healthy young adults in the community in the absence of risk factors. Epidemiol 
Infect 2010, 138:673-676. 
 20 
21.  Bygott J, Enoch DA, Carson RPM, Karas JA. Presumed community-acquired 
meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) isolates reflect spillover of 
healthcare-associated MRSA. J Hosp Infect 2008, 69: 197-198. 
22. Harris SR, Cartwright EJ, Torok ME, Holden MT, Brown NM, Ogilvy-Stuart AL, et al: 
Whole-genome sequencing for analysis of an outbreak of meticillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus: a descriptive study. Lancet Infect Dis 2013, 13:130-136. 
23. Toleman MS, Reuter S, Coll F, Harrison EM, Peacock SJ: Local Persistence of Novel 
MRSA Lineage after Hospital Ward Outbreak, Cambridge, UK, 2011-2013. Emerg 
Infect Dis 2016, 22:1658-9. 
24. Holden MT, Hsu LY, Kurt K, Weinert LA, Mather AE, Harris SR, et al. A genomic 
portrait of the emergence, evolution, and global spread of a methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus pandemic. Genome Res 2013, 23:653-64. 
25.  NHS Five Year Forward View. October 2014. https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/5yfv-web.pdf.  
 
  
 21 
Table 
Table 1.  
Patient and sample information.  
 
Figure legends 
Figure 1.  
Maximum likelihood tree generated from SNP sites in the core genome for 1,715 CC22 
isolates from the 2012-2013 study. The clade highlighted in grey is the largest cluster (with 
a maximum SNP cut-off of 50) within the collection, and represents patients registered to 
the study GP surgery.  
 
Figure 2.  
Flow diagram summarising patient identification. One patient was captured by both the 
community cluster and extended retrospective laboratory record review.  
 
Figure 3.   
Phylogenetic analyses of 29 MRSA ST22 isolates from 15 cases linked to a GP surgery. 
Midpoint rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome. Each isolate is 
labelled as patient (P) study number_isolate number_year of isolation.  Circles indicate 
multiple isolates from the same patient, with each color being unique to a patient. Cases 
without circles signify those with a single isolate.  
 
Figure 4.  
A: Date of first known positive MRSA sample (denoted by black star) for 13 individuals 
investigated in public health investigation, and the preceding 6-month window (grey boxes) 
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during which contacts with healthcare for each case were established. Red open circles 
denote date of genomically confirmed cluster lineage MRSA samples for each individual.  
B: Timeline summarising healthcare contact for 13 cases in the 6 months prior to first MRSA 
positive sample. The timeline for each case does not necessarily overlap and ranges 
between 2006-2015.  Recorded contact with healthcare represented by: Open circle, 
hospital; Red square, ulcer clinic; Open square, any other GP visit. Black crosses indicate 
date of negative MRSA sample.   
 
 
Supplementary files  
Table S1.  
Sequence accession numbers and sequencing information. 
 
Figure S1. 
Phylogenetic analysis of 29 MRSA ST22 isolates from 15 cases linked to a GP surgery. 
Midpoint rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome. Colored bars 
indicate spa genotype: red, t294; blue, t032; yellow, t379; orange, t1302; purple t492; grey, 
not typable/not done. 
 
Figure S2.  
Comparative incidence rate of MRSA for the study GP surgery and four comparable general 
practices. Bold line represents practice studied. Practices not labelled to maintain 
organisational anonymity. 
 
 
